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Patenting Genes and Genetic Methods: What’s at 
Stake? 
 
Abstract 
The emergence of genetic medicine following decades of molecular 
biology research has been accompanied by the procurement of patent rights 
to many medically significant genes and methods for their use. The 
intellectual force of reductionism in the life sciences—to explain biological 
phenomena with molecular precision—generates direct conflicts with patent 
law’s exclusion of basic knowledge from patenting: laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas must remain in the public domain. 
Patents have been obtained for the gene as an isolated DNA molecule, 
and for methods that rely on the assessment of genetic status to determine 
medical risk. Genetic testing can be used to identify disease susceptibility, 
establish diagnostic status, and design personalized therapeutic regimens in 
medical care. While many gene patents are managed so that wide access is 
facilitated, access to certain gene portfolios is quite restricted, preventing 
the development of a robust genetic testing climate for the relevant clinical 
conditions; this is most clearly observed for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. 
This constriction affects patients seeking to make genetically-informed 
medical decisions, health care providers offering genetic testing options, 
and scientists performing genetic research. In the absence of explicit 
facilitated access to critical genes that are under restrictive patent 
management, the central question of patent eligibility and whether such 
patents are valid will continue to be litigated. 
This is a period of renewed attention to the issue of patentable subject 
matter in the life sciences. It is only recently that a direct legal challenge to 
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the patent eligibility of a gene as an isolated DNA molecule was 
undertaken, in the case of Association for Molecular Pathology v. United 
States Patent and Trademark Office. Recent developments in the patent 
eligibility of method claims for biochemical assays, including genetic tests, 
have emerged in such cases as LabCorp v. Metabolite, Prometheus v. Mayo, 
and Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office. Identification of the relevant legal standard has 
implications for several kinds of method claims in genetic testing, where a 
patent claim may cover quantitative relationships between molecules, the 
mechanisms of pharmaceutical metabolism, or the cause and effect 
relationship between genotype and phenotype.  
Further resolution of the eligibility controversies in genetic patenting 
has larger theoretical implications. The life sciences await a definitive and 
modern interpretation of the product of nature doctrine and its scope, and a 
contemporaneous analysis of whether and how correlations in the life 
sciences are defined as natural phenomena or laws of nature. The resolution 
of eligibility for genes has implications for the patenting of other 
biomolecules, while the resolution of the eligibility of genetic testing 
methods has implications for the contours of the preemption analysis as 
applied to subject matter in the life and physical sciences, including such 
scientific sectors as nanotechnology. 
The article will outline the current legal frameworks for judging 
whether genetic-related inventions are patentable subject matter and 
identify the analytic choices available to the courts to decide the patent 
eligibility question for composition claims to genes and process claims to 
methods for genetic analysis. A central challenge to the eligibility question 
for genes is whether the courts should utilize a general or specific 
patentable subject matter theory for DNA; the choice will determine 
whether a decision has implications for general patenting in biotechnology.  
A central challenge to the analysis of life science method claims arises from 
the fact that the dominant analytic tests have been derived from the business 
method patent controversies, and illustrates how the technological neutrality 
of patent law causes doctrines that originate from one technical field to 
influence judicial review in an unrelated field. 
The appellate courts confront an opportunity to update the set of “basic 
tools” for genetic science, and to settle these eligibility controversies for the 
benefit of scientists, medical practitioners, and patients who wish to use 
isolated genes and genetic correlations in research and medical care. As the 
courts enforce inventive precision through the proper application of 35 
U.S.C. § 101, creative applications of fundamental knowledge will emerge 
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and legitimately solicit legal protection, while the intellectual foundations 
of genetic science remain accessible. It should be possible to reconcile the 
prohibitions on patenting laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas with careful patenting practices that advance the application of 
genetics to medicine.   
I. The Threshold Doctrine of Patent Eligibility 
The boundaries of the patent system define what may be patentable, and in 
parallel, define what cannot be patented and belongs in the public domain. 
The patentable subject matter inquiry assesses the eligibility of a proposed 
invention for patent protection. Patentable subject matter is defined as “any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof.”1 A gate keeping role for the 
patentable subject matter inquiry is legitimately inferred from its place in 
the numbering of statutory requirements for a patent as 35 U.S.C. § 101;2 
however, the grant of a patent follows an examination of a patent 
application for compliance with all formal statutory requirements.3  The 
designation of patentable subject matter as the threshold doctrine has been 
stated explicitly: “The first door which must be opened on the difficult path 
to patentability is §101,”4 and has been rephrased as “[w]hat kind of an 
invention or discovery is it?”5  In Parker v. Flook,6 the Supreme Court 
stated: “The obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be 
patented must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in 
fact, new or obvious.”7 Patentable subject matter within the bounds of 35 
U.S.C. § 101 must be new, nonobvious, and useful, and each of these 
inquiries are legally distinct.8  As a matter of linguistics, the term 
“patentable” subject matter is used both narrowly and broadly; but, 
formally, it represents an invention that meets the criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 
101, as opposed to meeting all the other statutory requirements in order to 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. The specific provisions of the patent statute which comprise the patent prosecution 
requirements are: 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), which discusses patentable subject matter and utility; 
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), addressing novelty; 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006), pertaining to 
nonobviousness; and 35 § 112 (2006), which describes the requirements for a written description, 
enablement, best mode and claim definiteness. 
 4. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 5. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 6. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 7. Id. at 593. 
 8. See infra note 20. 
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be “patentable.”9 As a general matter, the threshold issue of patentable 
subject matter does not surface frequently. In the context of patent 
litigation, the doctrine is often ignored or under-litigated for reasons related 
to the complexity of analysis required as well as a more general 
disinclination on the part of potential litigants.10   
Defining what is not patentable subject matter is determined by some 
statutory exclusions,11 but more importantly, by the courts.  The Supreme 
Court has stated that the “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas” are not patentable.12  While considering whether a software-related 
invention might lead to the patenting of basic mathematical principles, the 
Court elaborated on its rationale: “Phenomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not 
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work.”13  Later, as the Court encountered an invention from the emerging 
field of biotechnology, it further stated:  
 
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces 
every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas have been held not patentable. Thus, a new 
mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild 
is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not 
patent his celebrated law that E = mc2; nor could Newton have 
patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations 
of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”14  
 
These often-quoted statements form the foundation of the Supreme Court’s 
attention to the task of line-drawing at the boundary of the patent system, 
although the practical application of these principles has proven 
complicated. The underlying rationale for the exclusions is that scientific 
 
 9. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593, 594 n.16 (noting that a strict interpretation of §101 defines 
what invention is considered “patentable” notwithstanding the other statutory requirements). 
 10. See Eileen M. Kane,  Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 519, 528–29 (2006) (noting the general absence of the issue in patent litigation, 
and discussing how the mutual disinclination of litigants to raise eligibility challenges can be 
traced to the potentially far–reaching consequences of ineligibility decisions). 
 11. There are only several instances of differential statutory treatment of technical subject 
matter for patent law.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006) (limiting the enforceability of 
medical procedure patents against health care providers).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2006) 
(making inventions regarding nuclear weapons or related inventions not patentable.). 
 12. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 13. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 14. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted). 
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advances depend on an available substrate of basic knowledge, and that, 
therefore, patenting the intellectual foundations of a field has an adverse 
effect on its progress. Lower courts have also attempted to describe this 
non-statutory landscape.15 The significance of line-drawing underlies 
Justice Kennedy’s recent statement that the patentable subject matter 
inquiry must perform “the larger object of securing patents for valuable 
inventions without transgressing the public domain.”16 
Volatility in the judicially-created tests for patentable subject matter 
has been a feature of this area of patent law.  The unstable nature of the 
patent eligibility doctrine is evident from patent law jurisprudence, as legal 
tests have been developed at one juncture, only to fall out of use or into 
explicit disregard or repudiation.  Some of this history includes the mental 
steps exception,17 the software-generated litmus tests such as the 
mathematical algorithm exception,18 the Freeman-Walker-Abele test for 
identifying an unpatentable algorithm,19 and the business method-generated 
litmus tests such as the “technological arts” requirement,20 the “useful, 
concrete and tangible result” test from State Street v. Signature,21 and the 
recent machine or transformation test elevated by the Federal Circuit and 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos.22 The particular 
cross-technical implications of evolving eligibility tests will be further 
discussed with respect to the analysis of life science method claims in Part 
III.23 
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore how patents have 
been viewed for their instrumental effect on the development of genetic 
science and medicine, but some brief observations can be made. Estimates 
of the number of gene patents vary; one study has documented that 20% of 
 
 15. Prior to the Chakrabarty and Diehr cases, it was understood that, “[T]he following are not 
within the statutory categories of subject matter enumerated in § 101 and its predecessor statutes 
as interpreted through the years: principles, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual concepts, 
ideas, natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calculation, fundamental truths, 
original causes [and] motives. . . .”  In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 16. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 17. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  
 18. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–72. 
 19. See Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 20. Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ2d 1385 (B.P.A.I. 2005). 
 21. 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998). 
 22. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 23. See infra Part III. 
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human genes are patented.24  The Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Genetics Health and Society (SACGHS), undertook a recent and 
comprehensive analysis on the need for and impact of patents affecting 
genetic testing.25  The incentive structure of patent law as applied to genetic 
testing was analyzed at three junctures: the impact on inventive activity, 
disclosure, and product development.  The SACGHS concluded that ample 
evidence existed that the pace and volume of genetic discovery was not a 
patent-induced phenomenon.26  Similarly, the availability of patents was 
not necessary to enhance disclosure of genetic discoveries, as other 
incentives exist for scientists to engage in such work.27  Finally, the 
SACGHS looked at whether investment toward the development of genetic 
tests was amplified by the existence of patent rights.  Here, the report 
concluded that investment efforts could be traced to the availability of 
patent rights; however, there are some specific considerations applicable to 
genetic testing as an area of research and development.28  Most genetic tests 
are laboratory-developed tests (LDTs), which are offered as in-house 
services instead of being sold through commercial test kits, thus avoiding 
any FDA approval process.29  A key distinction where patent rights do exist 
in a clinical field is whether the patent owner employs exclusive licensing, 
effectively restricting the market or non-exclusive licensing, which allows a 
 
 24. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 
310 SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005). 
 25. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010), available at http://oba.od nih.gov/oba/sacghs  
/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf [hereinafter SACGHS Report]; see also Neil A. 
Holtzman & Michael S. Watson, Promoting Safe and Effective Genetic Testing in the United 
States, NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE,  (1997), available at  
http://www.genome/10001733 (defining genetic testing as “[t]he analysis of human DNA, RNA, 
chromosomes, proteins, and certain metabolites in order to detect heritable disease–related 
genotypes, mutations, phenotypes or karyotypes for clinical purposes. Such purposes include 
predicting risk of disease, identifying carriers and establishing prenatal and clinical diagnosis or 
prognosis”). 
 26. See id. at 23 (“[T]his information suggests that scientists are motivated to conduct genetic 
research by reasons other than patents, suggesting that discoveries will be sought regardless of the 
availability of intellectual property rights.”). 
 27. See id. at 28 (“[I]t appears that scientists have sufficient reasons independent of patents to 
disclose gene–disease associations and that patent claims to genes may be diminishing research 
that builds on disclosed genetic discoveries.”). 
 28. See id. at 30 (concluding that there is a correlation between intellectual property, licensing 
and accompanying investment incentives). 
 29. See, e.g., Gail H. Javitt et al., Direct–to–Consumer Genetic Tests, Government Oversight, 
and the First Amendment: What the Government Can (And Can’t) Do to Protect the Public’s 
Health, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 251, 272–73 (2004); Eileen M. Kane, Patent–Mediated Standards in 
Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH  L. REV. 835, 839–43 (2008). 
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competitive market to flourish.30  The SACGHS did find that investment 
toward the commercialization of genetic testing was stimulated in some 
instances by patent rights managed through an exclusive licensing model; 
however, in other instances, genetic testing services were developed where 
no patent rights were available, or where non-exclusive patent licensing was 
the dominant model.31  Therefore, the overall conclusion was measured: 
  
Based on all of the above information, patent-derived exclusive 
rights are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the 
development of genetic test kits and laboratory-developed tests. 
In the area of laboratory-developed tests particularly, where 
development costs are not substantial, patents were not necessary 
for the development of several genetic tests.32 
 
A separate analysis of litigation involving gene patents—which might 
be expected to reveal critical instances where patent rights influence the 
market structure—revealed few instances where patent rights were asserted 
by gene patent holders, and the overall conclusion was that gene patents 
collectively have not created significant obstacles to the development of 
genetic science.33  Nonetheless, independent empirical studies document 
where gene patents are managed by patent owners to the detriment of a 
robust genetic testing climate for some diseases, such as the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 patents and their use for determination of risk for early onset breast 
and ovarian cancers. 34 
The application of the various patent law doctrines to patents that 
involve gene sequences has evolved through a series of cases that tested 
issues of patentability and patent claim scope.35 This line of cases is now 
 
 30.  See SACGHS Report, supra note 25, at 38–39 (discussing previous studies’ conclusions 
on the effect patents and exclusive licenses have on the competitive market). 
 31. See id. at 28–35 (discussing how exclusive and non–exclusive patent licensing impact 
genetic testing services). 
 32. Id. at 35. 
 33. See Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and 
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 360–61 (2007) 
(noting that gene patents have posed few obstacles to the development of genetic science). 
 34. See, e.g., Robert Cook–Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on 
Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian 
Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS IN MEDICINE S15, S15 (2010) (comparing the effects 
of patenting on the availability of several cancer–related genetic tests). 
 35. See generally Kenneth J. Burchfiel, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (2d ed. 
2010). 
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almost twenty years old.36 Interestingly, the threshold issue of patentable 
subject matter was not the earliest doctrinal battle, but the latest. The earlier 
doctrinal highlights include the following issues: the scope of claims to 
DNA sequences under the disclosure doctrines of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Fiers v. 
Revel,37  Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,38 and Regents of the 
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.39); the evolving obviousness of 
cloning methods under 35 U.S.C.§ 103 (In re Deuel40 and In re Kubin41) 
and the utility of gene excerpt sequences under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (In re 
Fisher42).  
The direct legal challenge to the patent eligibility of a DNA molecule 
encoding a gene is presented by the recent case, Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (AMP).43  The 
case is a vehicle for presenting the long-standing controversy over the 
patent eligibility of purified DNA, and will be further discussed in Part II, 
infra.44 Recent developments in the patent eligibility of method claims in 
biochemical assays, including genetic tests, have emerged in such cases as 
LabCorp v. Metabolite,45 Prometheus v. Mayo,46 and AMP47 and will be 
discussed in Part III, infra.48 These cases occur against the backdrop of 
evolving legal standards for method claims, most clearly drawn from State 
Street v. Signature49 and Bilski v. Kappos,50 both involving business 
method patents. These latter cases contributed new standards for identifying 
eligible patentable subject matter, particularly for intangible inventions less 
related to physical technology.  Identification of the relevant legal test for 
considering the eligibility of method claims in genetic testing can be 
outcome-determinative, and the influence of the tests derived from business 
 
 36. The first major patent infringement litigation involving a gene patent was Amgen v. 
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 37. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 38. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1200. 
 39. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 40. 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 41. 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 42. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 43. 702 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 44. See infra Part II. 
 45. 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam). 
 46. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 47. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 48. See infra Parts III.B–D. 
 49. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 50. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
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method patent cases can be seen in the recent life science litigations 
involving the use of scientific correlations in patent method claims.51   
This recent cluster of patent eligibility cases from the life sciences has 
finally generated the legal momentum that is likely to result in definitive 
interpretations of the eligibility of genes and genetic methods for patenting.  
For the life sciences, the common-law exclusions from patentable subject 
matter that coexist with the statutory categories means that there are 
compositions of matter that would formally qualify but may be barred as 
products of nature, and there are methods that would formally qualify but 
may be barred because they preempt natural phenomena or laws of nature. 
The article will outline the current analytic framework for judging whether 
genetic-related inventions are patentable subject matter and identify the 
analytic choices available to decide the patent eligibility question for 
composition claims to genes and process claims to methods for genetic 
analysis. The technological-neutrality of patent law coexists with field-
specific controversies over patentable subject matter, and the current legal 
framework reflects this complicated set of realities. 
II. The Gene: Product or Law of Nature? 
A. Background of the Problem 
The patent eligibility of DNA as a product—in the form of genes— has 
been debated for several decades in U.S. patent law, as well as other fora 
including the bioethical and scientific communities.52  At first glance, DNA 
can be simply classified as a molecule which fits into the patent-eligible 
category of composition of matter.53  DNA is often claimed as a molecule 
in a purified state, which distinguishes it from its native form.54  Such claim 
language is intended to obviate any objection based on lack of novelty.55 
The United States Patent Trademark Office has endorsed the eligibility of a 
purified gene for patenting, relying on the reasoning that purification of the 
DNA molecule results in an isolated form of the molecule that does not 
 
 51. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the analytic background and Parts III.B–D for 
discussions of the application of existing legal tests. 
 52. See Kane, supra note 10, at 521–22 (discussing the debate regarding the patentability of 
DNA and how it was not resolved by cases such as Chakrabarty). 
 53. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 54. See Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. 
REV. 707, 738–39 (2004) (discussing the use of a purified compound as a patentable entity). 
 55. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
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exist in nature.56  In Amgen v. Chugai,57 where patentable subject matter 
was not challenged, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the standard claiming 
practice: “The claims of the ‘008 patent cover purified and isolated DNA 
sequences encoding erythropoietin [ . . . ]”58 In a later statement reflecting a 
view that DNA might present some unique analytic challenges for patent 
law, the court noted that “[A] gene is a chemical compound, albeit a 
complex one [ . . . . ].”59 
 Sharp criticism of the issuance of patents on genes has been 
maintained for years by many genetic testing advocates, who cite particular 
fields where genetic testing and research has been impeded by patenting.60  
An academic legal debate over DNA eligibility has focused on the nature of 
the DNA molecule, with scholars noting that while DNA fits into the 
category of composition of matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, its function as an 
information carrier complicates the analysis.61 Some have argued for 
renewed attention to the product of nature doctrine from patent law, a 
doctrine which has historically been interpreted to exclude the patenting of 
unaltered natural products,62 and asserted its relevance for testing the 
 
 56. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092–02 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“An 
isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is 
eligible for a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as a composition of matter 
or as an article of manufacture because that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in 
nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents because their purified state is 
different from the naturally occurring compound.”).  
 57. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 58. Id. at 1203–04. 
 59. Id. at 1206. 
 60. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives 
with Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 89 (2002) (describing the inhibiting effects 
of patents to the breast cancer genes on genetic research); John H. Barton, Emerging Patent Issues 
in Genomic Diagnostics, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 939, 940 (2006) (examining the effects of 
gene patents on genome-wide testing protocols); Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the 
Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002) (discussing the inhibiting effect of patents on the HFE genes 
on the availability of diagnostic tests for hereditary haemochromatosis). 
 61. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Molecules vs. Information: Should Patents Protect Both?, 8 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 190, 196 (2002) (characterizing DNA as “a tangible storage medium for 
information”); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 836 (1999) (stating that “[a]lthough DNA is, 
obviously enough, a chemical compound, it is more fundamentally a carrier of information.”). 
 62. There is substantial scholarship on the product of nature doctrine, both historically and in 
modern application.  See, e.g., Karl Bozicevic, Distinguishing “Products of Nature” from 
Products Derived from Nature, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 415, 425–26 (1987); John 
M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine 
as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 301, 319 
(2003); John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of 
Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
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eligibility of genes for patenting.63 An alternative analytic approach 
identifies the specific ineligibility of genes for patenting as a consequence 
of the fact that the molecule functions as a template to execute the genetic 
code; patenting preempts the use of the genetic code, which is a law of 
nature.64 These several theories of gene ineligibility are general (product of 
nature) and specific (preemption of a law of nature), and illustrate how 
nuances in the legal analysis result from the singular complexity of the 
DNA molecule. 
B. The Patenting of Two Genes Linked to Cancer Risk: AMP v. USPTO 
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office,65 (AMP) a formal challenge to the legitimacy of genes as 
patentable subject matter was brought by a coalition of professional medical 
organizations, medical providers, researchers and patients against Myriad 
Genetics (Myriad) and the USPTO.66 Myriad holds significant patent 
portfolios for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which have been linked to an 
elevated risk of developing early-onset breast and/or ovarian cancer.67  The 
Myriad patents are directed to the isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,68 
several clinically relevant mutations in the genes,69 and short fragments of 
 
SOC’Y 371, 390 (2003); Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH.  L.J.  293, 320 (1995).  
 63. See, e.g., Conley & Makowski, supra note 62, at 397–98 (2003) (revisiting Chakrabarty 
and asserting that many biotechnology patents would be invalid if the product of nature doctrine 
were to be applied as the Supreme Court intended); Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, 
Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology 
Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 334–90 (2003) (reviewing the distinction between impure and 
purified natural products, as well as introducing a “substantial transformation test” for patenting 
natural products); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 299 (2003) (proposing a “reinvigoration” of the 
product of nature doctrine for application to DNA patenting). 
 64. See Kane, supra note 54, at 752–53 (arguing for the patent ineligibility of DNA because it 
embodies the genetic code, which is a law of nature). 
 65. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).   
 66. Id.  
 67. See Yoshio Miki et al., A Strong Candidate for the Breast and Ovarian Cancer 
Susceptibility Gene BRCA1, 266 SCIENCE 66, 66 (1994) (identifying BRCA1 mutations as a 
significant indicator for early-onset breast and/or ovarian cancer); Richard Wooster et al., 
Identification of the Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene BRCA2, 378 NATURE 789, 790 (1995) 
(identifying BRCA2 mutations as increasing the risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer). 
 68. See AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (“Independent claim 1 of the '282 patent is 
representative of the group of composition claims and claims:  An isolated DNA coding for a 
BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 
2.”). 
 69. See id. at 212 n.29. Claim 7 of the ‘282 patent reads: 
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the genes used in laboratory assays.70 In addition to challenging the 
composition claims, the suit further alleged the ineligibility of the method 
claims directed to testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations.71 The history 
of the acquisition and management of these patents has been well 
documented, and significant criticism of Myriad’s practices has followed.72  
Myriad chose to use its patent rights so that most clinical testing could only 
be procured through the laboratory services offered by Myriad, which has 
heightened the scientific and medical concerns over the lack of a 
competitive genetic testing market.73  Relevant to this suit was that Myriad 
had targeted some of the plaintiffs for possibly infringing use of the patents 
in genetic testing.74  That fact sufficed for the judge to rule that the 
plaintiffs had the standing to bring the suit.75 
The central arguments of the plaintiffs against the patent eligibility of 
the composition claims to isolated DNA was that the claimed genes are 
both “products of nature” and “manifestations of laws of nature” for which 
patents may not be obtained.76 Although the Supreme Court has stated that 
 
An isolated DNA selected from the group consisting of: (a) a DNA having the 
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 1 having T at nucleotide position 4056; 
(b) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID N0:1 having an extra C 
at nucleotide position 5385; (c) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ 
ID NO: 1 having G at nucleotide position 5443; and (d) a DNA having the nucleotide 
sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 1 having 11 base pairs at nucleotide positions 189-
199 deleted. 
Id. 
 70. Id. at 212. 
 71. See infra Part III.D.  for a discussion of the challenge to the method claims. 
 72. See, e.g., Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 
12 GENETICS IN MED. S39, S43–45 (2010) (criticizing Myriad for its failure to account for policy 
concerns in healthcare during its commercialization); Jon F. Merz, Disease Gene Patents: 
Overcoming Unethical Constraints on Clinical Laboratory Medicine, 45 CLINICAL CHEM. 324, 
326 (1999) (discussing how different patent companies have secured licenses for various genetic 
testing, including tests for Alzheimer’s, HFE and BRCA1 and BRCA2); Jordan Paradise, 
European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing and the 
Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad 
Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 136–37 (2004) (noting that 
Myriad was exploiting the patent to block all research investigations of BRCA1); Bryn Williams-
Jones, History of A Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of Commercial BRCA 
Testing, 10 HEALTH L. J. 123, 132–33 (2002) (discussing the consensus that it was necessary to 
prevent exclusive control of the patent process by companies like Myriad). 
 73. See Gold & Carbone, supra note 72, at S41–42 (describing how Myriad attempted to stop 
BRCA testing at competing laboratories after obtaining its patents). 
 74. AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 204–05 (S.D.N.Y 2010). 
 75. Id. at 205–06 (describing the actions the defendants have taken to assert their exclusive 
right to BRCA1/2 genetic testing including personal communications, cease and desist letters, 
licensing offers, and litigation). 
 76. Id. at 184.   
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“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not 
patentable,77 the initial legal question for the case was whether the purified 
and isolated DNA was in fact a product of nature and not patentable.78  The 
cases considering this question to date center on what level of human 
intervention makes a product not natural, and court opinions diverge on 
when a product is significantly altered from its natural state to legitimize 
eligibility.  The Supreme Court has contended little with this question, with 
only several cases that investigate the patentability of natural products or 
inquire as to the kind of inventive application that justifies patenting.79  
In American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.,80 directed to an 
invention of a chemically-treated orange, the Supreme Court decided that 
the addition of borax to the rind of an orange to increase its longevity did 
not confer a patentable distinction, when compared to an unadulterated 
orange, to create an article of manufacture, stating “[a]ddition of [the] borax 
to the rind of [the] natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an 
article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or 
property.”81 The Court did not consider improved longevity to be to be a 
new property, nor did it consider it to be so useful as to support 
patentability.82  It also did not regard the treated orange as possessing any 
new function as a result of the treatment.83  Later, in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co.,84 an inventor claimed to have created a novel mixture 
of bacterial species with no inhibition of function and argued that this 
accomplishment was not expected and reflected his own inventive 
contribution.85  The Court disagreed, noting that “[h]e who discovers a 
hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it 
which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, 
it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful 
end.”86 The inventor’s focus on the natural non-inhibition actually worked 
to deny a patent: “[t]he qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
 
 77. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 78. AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 222–32 (S.D.N.Y 2010). 
 79. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).      
 80. 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
 81. Id. at 11. 
 82. Id. at 11–12. 
 83. Id. at 12. 
 84. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 85. Id. at 130. 
 86. Id. 
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knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none.”87  The Court’s decision also 
described the inventor’s work as the “discovery of some of the handiwork 
of nature.”88 
In the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,89 where a bacterium 
was genetically engineered to contain additional genes encoding proteins 
useful in the degradation of oil spills, the Court confronted a sharper 
distinction between the natural and the invented, describing the bacterium 
as a “human-made, genetically engineered bacterium [that] is capable of 
breaking down multiple components of crude oil”90 a property “which is 
possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria.”91 The bacterium was 
compared to the invention in Funk: “Here, by contrast, the patentee has 
produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His 
discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is 
patentable subject matter under § 101.”92  The Court identified a 
deceptively simple binary choice for product claims in the life sciences, 
noting that “the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate 
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-
made inventions.”93 
If the product of nature doctrine requires the exclusion of unaltered, 
natural products from the patent system, the next question for gene 
eligibility is factual: is a gene a product of nature or a manifestation of the 
laws of nature? In AMP, the plaintiffs argued that a gene is a product of 
nature, which is not patentable.94  The defendants argued, in contrast, that 
the isolation and purification of a DNA molecule constitutes an alteration 
from the natural state, and as such, the DNA is no longer the natural 
product.95  Although the weight of the Supreme Court decisions forbids the 
patenting of naturally-derived products, proponents of patenting genes and 
other biomolecules base their arguments on lower court cases. The case 
most frequently cited for establishing that purification can form the basis 
for converting a natural product to an inventive form is Parke-Davis v. 
 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 131.   
 89. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 310.    
 93. Id. at 313. 
 94. 702 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (2010). 
 95. Id. at 224. 
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Mulford (Parke-Davis).96 The defendants further argued that the processing 
of the DNA molecule rendered it usable, echoing the arguments that were 
advanced in favor of patenting purified adrenaline in Parke-Davis.97 
The judge first established that products of nature are not patentable, 
with a review of the relevant cases.98  Turning to Parke-Davis,99 he noted 
that although Judge Hand had concluded that purified adrenaline was 
patentable, citing his finding that it became for every practical purpose a 
“new thing commercially and therapeutically[,]”100 the holding centered on 
a novelty analysis, not an eligibility question.101  As such, it did not provide 
a basis for a purification argument regarding the eligibility of natural 
molecules.102   
The judge turned to a deeper investigation of the DNA molecule 
proposed for patenting, first looking to its function, or “the unique 
characteristics of DNA that differentiate it from other chemical 
compounds,”103 citing to expert statements regarding the bifunctional 
nature of DNA as both molecule and information carrier.104  The court then 
noted that “This informational quality is unique among the chemical 
compounds found in our bodies, and it would be erroneous to view DNA as 
‘no different’ than other chemicals previously the subject of patents.”105 
In analyzing what the informational component of DNA accomplishes, 
the judge noted that, “the information encoded by DNA reflects its primary 
biological function: directing the synthesis of other molecules in the 
body.”106  This statement clearly acknowledges the singular attribute of 
DNA as a template.  How does that template work?  “DNA, and in 
particular the ordering of its nucleotides, therefore serves as the physical 
embodiment of laws of nature—those that define the construction of the 
human body.”107  This function remains in the isolated form of the 
molecule: “The preservation of this defining characteristic of DNA in its 
native and isolated forms mandates the conclusion that the challenged 
 
 96. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (holding that the purified adrenaline was patentable). 
 97. 189 F. at 103. 
 98. AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220–32. 
 99. 189 F. at 95. 
 100. Id. at 103. 
 101. AMP, 702 F. Supp. at 225. 
 102. Id. at 225–26. 
 103. Id. at 228. 
 104. Id.   
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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composition claims are directed to unpatentable products of nature.”108  In 
his citation of “the unique characteristics of DNA that differentiate it from 
other chemical compounds,”109 the judge highlighted the fact that his 
method of analysis is explicitly DNA-centric, although anchored in the 
product of nature doctrine. He locates the identity of DNA along a 
molecule-function-information-template axis to reach a conclusion that the 
unaltered and unique template function of DNA survives purification, and 
the isolated gene therefore remains a product of nature. 
The specific patent ineligibility of the genes can be further theorized 
by understanding the genes as the natural exemplars of the genetic code, 
which is a law of nature.110 With this characterization of DNA function, the 
eligibility analysis is extended further along a molecule-function-
information-template-law of nature axis, and the inquiry shifts to asking 
whether patenting preempts a law of nature, a question that is distinct from 
the product of nature analysis. It has long been established that 
“manifestations of laws of nature [are] free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”111  At the genome-wide level, the patenting of genes 
can be viewed as an application of the merger doctrine to understand how 
the preemption of a law of nature occurs—if the finite set of expressions 
(the genes) of the underlying law of nature (the genetic code) are subject to 
private appropriation, then the underlying law of nature has itself has been 
preempted through patenting.112  This theory of the specific patent 
ineligibility of genes is consonant with the focus of the AMP113 court on the 
“unique characteristics”114 of DNA, which can be translated to the 
bifunctional identity of DNA—as molecule and template. While the 
defendants argued that making the DNA useable is the result of 
purification,115 and thus worthy of patent recognition, the weight of the 
opinion is that any exclusive “use” of DNA obtained through patent 
protection is to be avoided, precisely because its critical template functions 
require that it remain in the public domain. 
 
 108. Id. at 229. 
 109. Id. at 228. 
 110. See Kane, supra note 54, at 744, 752 (describing the function of DNA as executing the 
genetic code and characterizing  the genetic code as a law of nature).   
 111. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1947). 
 112. Kane, supra note 54, at 754.  The merger doctrine from copyright law identifies instances 
where property rights in all expressions of an underlying idea amount to practical ownership of the 
idea itself. Id. 
 113. 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181 (2010). 
 114. Id. at 228. 
 115. Id. at 230. 
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In conclusion, the judge accepted the arguments of the plaintiffs that 
the patenting of genes violates the prohibitions against patenting products 
of nature or manifestations of the laws of nature, and ruled that the 
challenged patent claims were invalid.116 The general applicability of the 
product of nature analysis in the opinion remains to be determined: should 
the maintenance of native biological function foreclose the eligibility of any 
natural product, including all biomolecules, or, alternatively, does the 
singular biological function of DNA create an entitlement to designation as 
a very special “product of nature?” The analysis is important, because one 
view will support a generic application of this product of nature analysis in 
biotechnology, while the other, narrower interpretation of the product of 
nature analysis highlights the unique and important function of DNA as the 
basis for its analysis. The judge’s characterization of DNA as the 
embodiment of a law of nature supports a theory of specific patent 
ineligibility for DNA, a conclusion that does not extend to other molecules. 
It is important to note that although the opinion is particularly DNA-centric, 
it establishes the complex ineligibility of DNA for patenting according to 
patent law norms, rather than as a statement of genetic exceptionalism. The 
appeal to the Federal Circuit will now provide the appellate court with its 
first opportunity to decide an eligibility challenge to gene patents. 
Why wasn’t the patent eligibility of a gene litigated until now?  There 
are several reasons, including the disinclination of commercially similar 
litigants as well as the absence of any formal opposition mechanism in U.S. 
patent law.117  In the absence of any formal eligibility decision on gene 
patents from the courts, remedial actions to limit any harm from gene 
patenting have been proposed. Legislative proposals to exclude genetic-
related inventions from patentable subject matter have been made at the 
federal level, but none have been enacted.118  In another approach, the 
recent SACGHS report recommended certain liability exclusions that would 
alleviate the impact of gene patents on research and patient care.119 
 
 116. AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 232. 
 117.  See generally Kane, supra note 10, at 557. 
 118. A recent example is the Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. 
§ 2 (2007).  This bill would have added a new Section 106 to the patent statute: “Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, no patent may be obtained for a nucleotide sequence, or its functions 
or correlations, or the naturally occurring products it specifies.”  In addition to singling out genetic 
products, the addition of the correlations may have excluded any patent claims to methods for the 
relevant genetic testing which exploit any identified mutations as the basis for identifying clinical 
risk. 
 119. Perhaps not surprisingly, after concluding that patents are less necessary than often 
thought, and yet pose less obstacles than frequently claimed, the SACGHS report does not call for 
a fundamental realignment of patentable subject matter to exclude gene patenting.  In contrast, the 
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Ironically, however, AMP emerges in a climate where some empirical 
knowledge has emerged regarding how gene patenting impacts the genetic 
testing field, with credible evidence supporting the conclusion that gene 
patents have not caused widespread underdevelopment of genetic 
science.120 However, the Myriad patent management practices have 
continued to draw distinct attention as some of the most pernicious, with 
recent comparative data emerging to illustrate a negative effect from the 
patents on the breast cancer genetic testing field, in comparison with the 
development of other similarly situated cancer-related genetic tests.121  
Moreover, some of the plaintiffs in AMP were targets of enforcement 
actions from Myriad for their activities related to providing genetic testing 
for patients.122  As a result, litigation over patent ineligibility remains an 
obvious pressure point in the efforts to expand the use of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes for use in genetic testing and research. Beyond the specific 
eligibility analysis of genes, AMP is also an opportunity for the courts to 
further clarify how the product of nature/law of nature doctrines apply to 
the modern patenting of molecules produced from biotechnology. 
III. Method Claims and Laws of Nature: Applied Uses or Preemptive Effect? 
A. Background of the Problem 
The evaluation of method claims relevant to genetic testing fits into wider 
controversies over the patenting of methods in business, software, and 
general human activities. A central observation in the current analytic 
picture for the eligibility of method claims in genetic testing is that the 
recent analytic tests that have dominated eligibility decisions were 
developed by the Federal Circuit from cases investigating the patent 
eligibility of business methods. The era began with State Street v. 
Signature,123 which presented a patent claim to a software-implemented 
 
SACGHS opted to call for “an exemption from liability for infringement of patent claims on genes 
for anyone making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or selling a test developed under the patent 
for patient-care purposes.”  SACGHS Report, supra note 25, at 4.  In addition, the report calls for 
“an exemption from patent infringement liability for those who use patent-protected genes in the 
pursuit of research.” Id.  This is a moderate proposal, in that it effectively nullifies the impact of 
some gene patents for some purposes, while not recommending a wholesale elimination of such 
patents through a formal subject matter exclusion. 
 120. See supra notes 25 and 33 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 34, at S29 (documenting that Myriad’s patents may be 
responsible for a chilling effect on further development of genetic tests for the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes). 
 122. Id. at 204–06. 
 123. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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method for financial accounting.124  While arguably a typical software case, 
the Federal Circuit struggled again with the possible patenting of an 
algorithm or mathematical formula, the lingering controversy that 
accounted for decades of wrangling over software patent eligibility.125  The 
court offered a new standard that did not require a proposed invention to fit 
into a category of 35 U.S.C. § 101; instead, an invention that achieved a 
“useful, concrete and tangible result” (UCT) would be eligible.126  Over the 
decade since that decision, patent applicants relied on the UCT test 
articulated in that case to advance many inventions that lacked obvious 
tangibility, but which, arguably, could achieve a useful result.127 The UCT 
test survived for nearly a decade, although on shaky ground, as illustrated 
by Justice Breyer’s comment in 2006 that, “[T]his Court has never made 
such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances 
where this Court has held the contrary.”128   
A redesigned analytic framework emerged from the Federal Circuit 
during In re Bilski (Bilski),129 the first business method patent case to be 
heard later by the Supreme Court.130 At issue was a claim to a method of 
commodity trading that was untethered to software implementation; 
arguably, a pure business method patent.131 Underneath the eligibility 
 
 124. Id. at 1373. 
 125. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an 
Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 384–86 (2002) (discussing the patentability of 
algorithms and mathematical formulas); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against 
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY 
L.J. 1025, 1025 (1990). 
 126. State St., 149. F.3d at 1373.  This test had also been used to decide the eligibility of a 
rasterizer that mathematically transforms data in  In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 127. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc. 172 F.3d 1352, 1353, 1357–58, 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (relying on the UCT test to uphold patentability of a method for recording a 
telephone call recipient’s primary interexchange carrier). 
 128. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 129. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 130. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 131. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 (“Claim 1: A method for managing the consumption risk 
costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: (a) 
initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said 
commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical 
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; (b) identifying market 
participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and (c) 
initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at 
a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk 
position of said series of consumer transactions.”). 
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question was the tangibility analysis that had plagued software cases, but 
now particularly plagued the non-software business/human activity method 
claims that arose in the post-State Street decade, and elicited widespread 
criticism.132 Bilski provided an opportunity for the Federal Circuit to revisit 
the State Street standard, and it concluded that the UCT test was 
“inadequate.”133 It framed its inquiry as “whether Applicants are seeking to 
claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or a mental 
process.”134  Having structured the problem, it stated that the Supreme 
Court had already provided a “definitive test to determine whether a process 
claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular 
application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle 
itself.”135 The court announced that “the machine-or-transformation (MOT) 
test outlined by the Supreme Court is the proper test to apply.”136  If a 
machine implementation is readily identifiable, then patentable subject 
matter is presumed.  However, if that is not present, then the presence of a 
“transformation” in the patent claim will also signify patentable subject 
matter.137  The Federal Circuit had now established that the MOT test 
would do the work of the preemption analysis, so that the tests could be 
 
 132. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 
1181 (1999) (arguing that patentable subject matter should exclude business methods which “do 
not comprise technology and should not be within the grasp of the patent system”). 
 133. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60.  
 134. Id. at 952. 
 135. Id. at 954.  The preemption analysis is central to the exclusion of natural principles, laws 
and phenomena, as it identifies those scenarios where essential knowledge has been removed from 
the public domain.  The Bilski Court identified a nexus between the preemption analysis and the 
machine or transformation test:  
A claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a particular machine or 
apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not also use the specified 
machine or apparatus in the manner claimed. And a claimed process that transforms a 
particular article to a specified different state or thing by applying a fundamental 
principle would not pre-empt the use of the principle to transform any other article, to 
transform the same article but in a manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything 
other than transform the specified article. 
Id. 
 136. Id. at 960. The Court explained that “[a] claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 
101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article 
into a different state or thing.” Id. at 954.  The machine-or-transformation test has two further 
aspects: “the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article must impose meaningful 
limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent-eligibility,” and “the involvement of the machine or 
transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity.”  
Id. at 961–62 (citations omitted). 
 137. Id. at 961. 
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viewed as congruent.138 However, in her dissent, Judge Newman pointed 
out that an invention which is evaluated as a possible abstract idea is not 
necessarily testing the boundaries of patenting fundamental ideas; Bilski’s 
invention was “not a fundamental principle or an abstract idea; it is not a 
mental process or a law of nature.”139  She criticized the court for its 
interconversion of eligibility tests: “The court then concludes that because 
Bilski’s Claim 1 fails the machine-or-transformation test it ipso facto 
preempts a ‘fundamental principle’ and is thereby barred from the patent 
system under Section 101: an illogical leap that displays the flaws in the 
court’s analysis.”140  The interconversion of eligibility tests that occurred in 
the cases deciding the patenting of business methods is potentially 
problematic in cases that more clearly contest any patenting of fundamental 
knowledge which could violate the prohibition on patenting laws of nature 
and natural phenomena; such cases are likely to arise from the life 
sciences.141  
The centrality of the MOT test to the eligibility of patent method 
claims was revisited by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos.142 The 
Court declared that the MOT test was not the “sole test” for deciding 
whether method claims constitute patentable subject matter.143 Nearly two 
years passed between the Federal Circuit’s declaration that the MOT test 
was mandatory and the Supreme Court’s review which relaxed this 
requirement. The eligibility of life science patent method claims containing 
scientific correlations was contested during those years, and the resulting 
decisions occurred against this unstable analytic background, as will be 
discussed in Parts III.C., infra (Prometheus v. Mayo)144 and III.D., infra 
(AMP).145 As a result, these opinions reflect the analytic framework that 
was dominant at the time, regardless of the fact that the framework 
originally arose from business method patent cases. 
 
 138. See id. at 963 (stating that “the prevention of pre-emption of fundamental principles” was 
the basis for the machine-or-transformation test). 
 139. Id. at 995 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 996 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 141. See infra Parts III.B.,D. 
 142. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 143. Id. at 3227. 
 144. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 145. AMP v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2010). 
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B.  Bimolecular Relationship with Clinical Implications: LabCorp v. 
Metabolite 
In Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite 
Laboratories, Inc., 146 (LabCorp) the patent at issue claimed a method for 
detecting a vitamin deficiency by utilizing the quantitative relationship 
between the levels of the amino acid homocysteine and several B 
vitamins.147 There is an inverse relationship between the homocysteine and 
vitamin B levels, and that observation can be exploited to assess the clinical 
condition of the patient.148  
The defendant had not raised a formal invalidity challenge to the 
patent claims for lack of patentable subject matter in the trial court, 
although, in the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner LabCorp in the 
Supreme Court, the question of whether “a method patent . . . can validly 
claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship” was advanced.149  
While there is no specific reference to 35 U.S.C. § 101, the petitioners 
stated that “scientific facts and laws of nature are outside the scope of 
patentable inventions.”150  The fact that patentable subject matter had not 
formally been raised in the lower court complicated the suitability of this 
particular case for a significant ruling on this doctrine. While considering 
the petition for review, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to 
file a brief in the case, and directed attention to a newly posed question that 
directly invoked its trilogy of exclusions from patentable subject matter: “Is 
the patent invalid because one cannot patent ‘laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas?’”151 In this unusual procedural scenario, 
the Supreme Court initiated a more formal review of patentable subject 
 
 146. 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam). 
 147. Id. at 128.  Claim 13 is as follows: “A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or 
folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated 
level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body 
fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.” Id.  
 148. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 128.  
 149. Brief for Petitioner at i, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 
124 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2004 WL 2505526, available at http://patentlaw 
.typepad.com/patent/files/labcorp_Petition_for_certiorari.pdf. Question 3 stated:  
Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed, and non-enabling step 
directing a party simply to ‘correlat[e]’ test results can validly claim a monopoly over a 
basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor necessarily 
infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test 
result. 
Id. 
 150. Id. at 18. 
 151. Invitation to Solicitor General, LabCorp v. Metabolite, 543 U.S. 1185 (2005). 
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matter, despite the lack of any challenge in the lower courts. Ultimately, the 
Court concluded that it should not decide the issue.152  This decision by the 
Court occurred against a backdrop of intense interest in the case, which 
included the filing of numerous amicus briefs from professional medical 
organizations and clinical laboratory associations.153  The controversy was 
heightened due to the enforcement strategy of the patent holders, who had 
alleged contributory infringement on the part of those who simply 
disseminated the fact of the scientific correlation.154 
Justice Breyer filed a dissent that criticized the court for failing to 
decide the issue of patentable subject matter, noting that: 
 
To fail to do so threatens to leave the medical profession subject 
to the restrictions imposed by this individual patent and others of 
its kind. Those restrictions may inhibit doctors from using their 
best medical judgment; they may force doctors to spend 
unnecessary time and energy to enter into license agreements; 
they may divert resources from the medical task of health care to 
the legal task of searching patent files for similar simple 
correlations.155  
 
 The dissent then undertook the analysis that the court had avoided.  
Justice Breyer stated: “There can be little doubt that the correlation between 
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a ‘natural 
phenomenon.’”156  He rejected the idea that the scientific relationship was 
embedded in a specific method claim that implicitly narrowed the scope of 
the claim and preserved the wider use of the natural phenomenon: “But one 
can reduce any process to a series of steps. The question is what those steps 
embody. And here, aside from the unpatented test, they embody only the 
correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency that the 
researchers uncovered.”157  Thus, the dissent arrives at a conclusion that 
Claim 13 effectively monopolizes the scientific correlation between the 
 
 152. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 125. 
 153. See id. at 124–25 (describing briefs filed by various laboratories, organizations and 
individuals); see also Supreme Court: LabCorp Briefing Round I, PATENT LAW BLOG (Jan. 5, 
2006),  http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/01/supreme_court_l html. 
 154. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
 155. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 138 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 135. 
 157. Id. at 137–38.  
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levels of homocysteine and vitamin B, and preempts the use of a natural 
phenomenon, which is not allowed.158 
The method claim in LabCorp has a generic format as a laboratory 
assay which determines a primary fact (one biochemical measurement) as a 
marker for the determination of a secondary fact, which, in this case, is the 
correlative vitamin level of a patient. More generally, examples of a 
secondary fact to be determined could be any another molecular 
measurement, an inference regarding a pharmaceutical regimen, or a 
diagnostic conclusion. Is the relationship between the primary and 
secondary facts a scientific correlation which is the result of natural 
biological phenomena at work? Such claim modeling can be useful to 
identify other patent method claims which may devolve to nothing more 
than a natural phenomenon structured as a series of steps in a process. 
LabCorp raised the profile of this kind of method claim in the life sciences, 
and invited more detailed examination of these claims under the eligibility 
analysis provided by 35 U.S.C. § 101.159 It is important to note that the 
analytic framework for the Breyer dissent was the traditional assessment for 
the presence of a natural phenomenon, and whether it was preempted by the 
patent claim; several other analytic options were rejected.160 Breyer 
discarded the “useful concrete and tangible result” (UCT) test which was 
then extant as a result of State Street.161  He also rejected an argument, 
based in earlier process patent jurisprudence, that would evaluate the claim 
for the presence of a “transformation” that would signal a more 
conventionally patentable process, in language that would foreshadow the 
issues later raised by the method claims in Prometheus v. Mayo and 
AMP.162  More generally for the field, the sharp contrast between the 
formal silence of the Court on the eligibility issue and the spirited dissent 
from Justice Breyer on the dangers posed by patenting subject matter that 
belonged in the public domain signaled that this debate would remain 
unresolved.   
 
 158. See id. at 135. 
 159. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Lessons From Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 463, 464 (2007) 
(noting that the dismissal of certiorari leaves patent lawyers and institutional bodies waiting for a 
resolution on the scope of patentable subject matter). 
 160. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 138 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 136. 
 162. Id. (“Why should it matter if the test results themselves were obtained through an 
unpatented procedure that involved the transformation of blood?”). See infra Part III.C. 
      
E M. K 
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011 25 
C.  Metabolic State and Therapeutic Effect: Prometheus v. Mayo 
Prometheus Laboratories Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services163 
(Prometheus I) presented a patent claim to a method of therapeutic 
optimization that exploited an understanding of drug metabolism to more 
precisely tailor pharmaceutical dosage.164  The claim format was a method 
of treatment claim that relied on an understanding of the pharmacokinetics 
of the administered drug.165 Specifically, the method of treatment called for 
adjusting dosage levels of thiopurine drugs after administration by 
determining the level of a drug metabolite, 6-TG, which can be toxic at 
higher levels and undermine any therapeutic response.166   
The invalidity challenge for lack of patentable subject matter centered 
on the alleged presence of a scientific correlation or natural phenomenon 
that formed the basis of Claim 1; the correlation was the relationship 
between the metabolite levels and the toxicity of the pharmaceutical.167  
The district court and the Federal Circuit disagreed about claim 
construction. The lower court found that “the claims recite the correlations 
themselves”168 while the Federal Circuit stated that “the claims are to 
transformative methods of treatment, not correlations.”169  These statements 
flag the very different analytic frameworks applied to the claims by these 
courts. The district court identified the presence of a natural phenomenon as 
the defining characteristic of the patent method claim, and concluded that 
 
 163. 581 F.3d. 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 164. Id. at 1340 (“Claim 1 of the ‘623 patent is representative of the independent claims 
asserted by Prometheus in this case: A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of 
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-
thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) 
determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 
red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to 
said subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject.”). 
 165. See id. at 1339. 
 166. Id. at 1339–40. 
 167. Id. at 1340–41 (“Mayo contended that the patents impermissibly claim natural 
phenomena—the correlations between, on the one hand, thiopurine drug metabolite levels and, on 
the other hand, efficacy and toxicity—and that the claims wholly preempt use of the natural 
phenomena.”). 
 168. Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25062, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).  “Because the claims cover the correlations 
themselves, it follows that the claims ‘wholly pre-empt’ the correlations.”  Id. at *35. 
 169. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1349. 
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preemption occurred, invalidating the claim.170  However, in the period 
between the district court and Federal Circuit decisions in Prometheus I, 
Bilski171 was decided by the Federal Circuit, and it established that the 
MOT test was mandatory for the evaluating the eligibility of method 
claims.172  Of course, Bilski is not a patent case from the life sciences but a 
challenge to the patentability of business methods.173  The Federal Circuit 
decision in Prometheus I illustrates how an analytic test derived from the 
business method patent controversies can govern the eligibility analysis of 
subject matter in the life sciences.174 
In applying the MOT test to the method claim at issue in Prometheus I, 
the Federal Circuit went to great lengths in order to identify where 
transformations might occur.175 The court decided that transformations 
were accomplished by the administration of the drug to the patient and the 
subsequent act of analyzing the blood of a patient for the levels of 6-TG, 
thus satisfying the MOT test for eligibility.176 The Federal Circuit criticized 
the district court for “failing to recognize that the first two steps of the 
asserted claims are not merely data-gathering steps.”177 Numerous amicus 
briefs filed in the case noted the chilling effect of the method claims on the 
use of basic scientific facts.178  However, the Federal Circuit disagreed and 
stated that the patent claims “do not preempt natural processes; they utilize 
them in a series of specific steps.”179 Although the MOT test was the 
primary framework for considering the eligibility of the method claims, the 
analysis of the court further defined the method claim as an application, 
rather than a preemption, of a natural phenomenon. 
 
 170. Prometheus, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062, at *14. 
 171. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 172. Id. at 959 (noting that the machine-or-transformation test is the applicable test for patent-
eligible subject matter).   See also supra notes 130–44 and accompanying text. 
 173. See id. at 949 (“In essence, the claim is for a method of hedging risk in the field of 
commodities trading.”). 
 174. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (noting that the claimed methods in Prometheus satisfy all requirements of Bilski’s 
transformation test for patentability). 
 175. Id. at 1346–47 (discussing the transformation which must occur to determine the levels of 
6-TG or 6-MMP). 
 176. Id. at 1347, 1350. 
 177. Id. at 1347. 
 178. See e.g., Brief of American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 25–26, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 2008-1403) (noting negative impacts of patents on scientific facts, 
including stifling innovation, increasing health care costs, and interference with medical providers 
in patient care). 
 179. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1349. 
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When Bilski v. Kappos180 reached the Supreme Court, the court 
eliminated the MOT test as the sole determinant of the patentability of a 
method claim.181  It stated that the test could be useful, but not be 
mandatory.182  The Supreme Court then remanded Prometheus I back to the 
Federal Circuit to reconsider the patentable subject matter analysis in view 
of the multi-dimensional analysis it now endorsed.183 Prometheus II has 
now been reconsidered by the Federal Circuit.184 The court again concluded 
that the method claims were patentable subject matter, noting that they 
“recite a patent-eligible application of naturally occurring correlations”185 
and “do not wholly preempt all uses of the recited correlations.”186 
The method of treatment claim in Prometheus I/II incorporates the use 
of an uninvented scientific correlation to execute its goal of therapeutic 
optimization. It has  long been established that method of treatment claims 
are a generally allowable form of patentable subject matter, and that 
premise works to enhance the eligibility of this particular claim. However, 
the analysis of this complex patent method claim must contend with a 
possible distinction in patent law between methods of treatment and 
underlying biochemical mechanism of effect.  Ultimately, that dividing line 
is actually between the invented and the natural. It must be considered 
whether all substantial practical applications of the scientific relationship 
are preempted by the claim—in this case, the fact that 6-TG levels are 
responsible for drug toxicity.  Moreover, the administration of the drugs, 
while transformative, is not the novel aspect of the method.  Therefore, 
further analytic work must consider how the Bilski-inspired focus on 
transformations may dictate an analytic sequence that under analyzes the 
central question of preemption: are all substantial practical applications of a 
scientific correlation now covered by a patent claim?  If that question is 
formally asked at the beginning, and an authoritative answer provided, the 
answer should then be synthesized with a transformation analysis, if 
utilized, in order to ensure that the requirement for excluding laws of nature 
and natural phenomena from the patent system is maintained. 
 
 180. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 181. Id. at 3226. 
 182. Id. at 3227 (noting that the machine-or-transformative test is “a useful and important clue” 
but is not “the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process’”). 
 183. Prometheus, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), No. 09-490, vacated and remanded, 78 
USLW 3254 (U.S. June 29, 2010). 
 184. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25956 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 185. Id. at *20. 
 186. Id. 
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D. Genotype and Phenotype: AMP v. USPTO 
In AMP,187 the plaintiffs challenged the eligibility of patent claims to 
methods for determining whether the DNA sequence of an individual 
revealed any mutation in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes that conferred a 
higher risk for early onset breast and/or ovarian cancers.188  This patent 
claim exploits the molecular status of an individual, revealed through the 
DNA sequence (primary fact), to infer a clinical fact about a patient 
(secondary fact). It is an example of predictive genetic testing.189  In the 
cancer field, the identification of BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations which 
explain a genetic tendency for some to develop early-stage breast and/or 
ovarian cancer has led to the demand for genetic testing for individuals 
wishing to learn whether they carry mutations in their genes that elevate 
their susceptibility to the early-onset cancers.190  The plaintiffs argued that 
the scientific correlation central to the claim, in the form of a classic 
genotype/phenotype relationship, was a law of nature, and the method of 
analysis was simply an abstract idea; in either case, the claim was ineligible 
for patenting.191 
In the AMP decision, the judge centered his analysis on the application 
of the MOT test to the method claims.192  As referenced in the earlier 
discussion for Prometheus I,193 the eligibility standard for the method 
claims was the MOT test from Bilski that was elevated to answer the most 
pressing question in the business method patent field.194  The judge found 
that the claims did not pass the MOT test, as any purported transformation 
 
 187. 702 F. Supp. 2d  181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 188. Id. at 185.  Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,709, 999 is as follows:  
A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said alteration selected 
from a group consisting of the alterations set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18, or 19 in a 
human which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or BRCA1 RNA from 
a human sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA from 
said human sample with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a deletion of 4 
nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-4187 of SEQ ID N0:1. 
Id. at 213. 
 189. See supra note 29. 
 190. See Miki et al., supra note 67, at 66 (discussing the connection between BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 and breast and ovarian cancers). 
 191. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 19, 
AMP v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515), available at http://www 
.aclu.org/files/assets/brca_08262009_memoinsupportof_motionforsummjudge1.pdf. 
 192. See AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d  at 233 (articulating the application of the machine-or-
transformation test). 
 193. See supra Part III.C. 
 194. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text. 
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in the claims comparing patient DNA to normal DNA was not essential to 
the patent claim, and was simply a predicate to obtaining the data.195 In the 
rote application of the existing standard which required that any method 
claim be evaluated according to the MOT test, a more formal analysis of the 
public domain inspired prohibitions (laws of nature, natural phenomena) 
did not occur.196 
The application of the MOT test to the genetic testing method claims 
in AMP resulted in a finding that the claims lacked any transformations 
which would confer patent eligibility. This is a different outcome from the 
application of the MOT test to the method claims in Prometheus I/II.  
However, the more complex claim in Prometheus I/II, as discussed in Part 
III.C, supra, subsumed the use of the scientific correlation within a standard 
method of treatment claim. That claim structure allowed the courts to focus 
on the treatment method, and to leverage its potential eligibility in a manner 
that avoided a detailed examination of whether the scientific correlation 
became preempted by the patent claim. The genetic testing claim in AMP is 
a more direct presentation of the preemption question, as the claim is 
essentially reciting the performance of a laboratory assay utilizing the 
scientific correlation.  As a result, the claim analysis by the court identifies 
the purported transformations as simply incident to the establishment of the 
genotype/phenotype relationship, and therefore insufficient to support 
eligibility. While the reasoning in Prometheus I is explained by application 
of the MOT test, 197 the analysis in AMP is distracted by the test. In both 
cases, the life science field was deprived of a fuller analysis of the public 
domain inspired exclusions of subject matter that could have been 
performed, where more attention would be given to identifying when a 
natural phenomenon is presented and when it is preempted. The genetic 
testing claim in AMP is more analogous to the method claim presented in 
 
 195. AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (noting that “the transformations [ . . . ] would constitute no 
more than ‘data gathering step[s]’ [sic] that are not ‘central to the purpose of the claimed 
process’”). 
 196. See id. at 236–37 (describing the isolation and sequencing of DNA as merely data-
gathering steps).  See also generally Brian P. Murphy & Daniel P. Murphy, Bilski’s “Machine-or-
Transformation” Test: Uncertain Prognosis for Diagnostic Methods and Personalized Medicine 
Patents, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 755, 757–58 (2010) (arguing that the 
Fundamental Principles Exception is superior to the machine-or-transformation test because it 
more closely aligns with public policy).  The judge did find that Claim 20, directed to a method 
for assaying a chemotherapeutic compound in a transformed cell, was an attempt “to patent a 
basic scientific principle.” AMP, 702 F. Supp. 2d  at 237. 
 197. See Murphy &. Murphy, supra note 196, at 774  (“In our view, the mandatory machine-
or-transformation test caused the court to strain unnecessarily to try to fit a square peg into a round 
hole by arguing that the claims are methods of treatment.”). 
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LabCorp; both are laboratory assays that can result in the exclusive control 
of the use of an uninvented scientific correlation.  As a result, the issues left 
unresolved by the Supreme Court in LabCorp are now resurfacing in the 
form of the genetic testing claim in AMP.  The impact of these deliberations 
will be felt in genetic medicine, but even more broadly, across the wider 
fields of biochemical testing, where the limits of patent eligibility for the 
molecular observations from modern biological science remain unclear. 
E.  Scientific Correlations in the Era of Reductionism 
What are the common attributes of the disputed patent method claims in 
LabCorp, Prometheus I/II and AMP?  All of the claims center on 
identifying a data point (the primary fact), whether the homocysteine levels 
in LabCorp, the metabolite levels in Prometheus, or the presence of a DNA 
mutation in AMP.198  From the status of that observable and measurable 
data point, one is led to a conclusion regarding the patient’s metabolic state, 
the therapeutic potential of a pharmaceutical, or a patient’s genetic 
susceptibility to cancer (the secondary fact).  None of these claims, in their 
most general form, specifically require the use of a particular test method or 
device.199  The absence of these limiting mechanisms more clearly points to 
the conclusion that the claims must be evaluated for impermissibly claiming 
natural phenomena.  Potentially, any knowledge of the data point/primary 
fact—whether deliberately procured or assayed or incidentally obtained— 
will set up the possibility of infringement if the data is interpreted to arrive 
at a correlative conclusion/secondary fact.  
The patent method claims for genetic testing can capture the basic 
techniques of molecular medicine. Classical genetics advanced the theory of 
genotype and phenotype—a distinct chemical composition explaining 
biological manifestations. Modern molecular biology has allowed precise 
defining of the genotype of an individual down to the level of the genes, the 
DNA.  The much-heralded arrival of genetic testing to offer the genome-
level view promises to offer an individual a clinical forecast based on an 
innate genetic makeup, a personalized therapeutic regimen, or a precise 
diagnostic assessment. Patent claims which essentially cover the 
foundational genotype/phenotype relationships that comprise genetic 
 
 198. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006) (Breyer, 
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science may impermissibly preempt the use of the most basic genetic 
knowledge; the future appellate review of AMP may provide some 
authoritative guidance.  Following the recent Prometheus II decision,200 the 
question of whether scientific correlations that are tethered to treatment 
methods—such as the use of genotype/phenotype correlations in 
personalized therapeutic designs—are fully vetted for possible preemption 
requires further deliberation.  
The recent life science cases in the discussion illustrate several method 
claim formats that require an analysis for the patenting of natural 
phenomena: the simple laboratory assay-based method claim (LabCorp, 
AMP) or the more complex method of treatment claim (Prometheus I/II).  
Collectively, they illustrate the modern scope of the reductionism in the life 
sciences, which characterizes biological reality as the output from 
molecular interactions. Other upcoming patenting dilemmas in the life 
sciences arise from method claims that may capture the basic intellectual 
tasks in standard medical care. Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen 
IDEC,201 a life science case that presents a method claim which captures 
the relationship between medical treatment and clinical outcomes — 
tailoring an immunization protocol following the observation of patient 
responses — does not present a sharp biochemical correlation in the patent 
claim; however, this method claim format foreshadows the possibility of 
patenting any professional medical judgment, and is likely to face scrutiny 
as an abstract idea, as well as a natural phenomenon.202 All of these cases 
illustrate the challenge for patent law, in that each case presents the 
possibility of converting basic knowledge into patented subject matter.  The 
evolution of biological science must be synchronized with established 
eligibility limits from patent law; it is possible that modern life science 
research actually produces more subject matter that must remain in the 
public domain than can be captured through patenting. 
IV. Conclusion 
The paradox of patent eligibility as applied to inventions in the genetic 
sciences is that while this patent law doctrine has received the most critical 
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public attention, it has escaped the formal legal review that has mapped 
other patent law doctrines to biotechnological inventions.203  Thus, it is no 
surprise that the recent set of cases impacting the eligibility of genes and 
genetic methods has generated intense interest.  The patentable subject 
matter doctrine is charged with policing the domain of unpatentable ideas, 
which must remain available as the “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work”204 so critical to the progress rationale that animates the 
patent system. The intellectual force of reductionism in the life sciences— 
deepening the investigation of molecules and relationships that explain 
biological phenomena—generates direct conflicts with patent law’s 
exclusion of basic knowledge from patenting. 
The life sciences await a definitive and modern interpretation of the 
product of nature doctrine and its scope, and a contemporaneous analysis of 
whether and how correlations in the life sciences are regarded as natural 
phenomena or laws of nature.  The resolution of eligibility for genes has 
implications for the patenting of other biomolecules.  The resolution of 
eligibility of genetic testing methods has implications for the contours of 
the preemption analysis as applied to subject matter in the life and physical 
sciences, an issue that will likely emerge in such fields as nanotechnology. 
The DNA-centric reasoning of the judge in AMP205 might be 
interpreted to confine the implications of the decision to genes alone.  
However, the holding also solidifies a more generic understanding of the 
product of nature doctrine, expressed in other cases, that maintenance of 
function — without weighing the importance of the function—argues 
against patentable subject matter. In a DNA-specific view, the unique and 
complex role of DNA is accorded special analytic weight and DNA is 
excluded from patenting because of this special character. The sequential 
analysis for DNA can be diagrammed: molecule-function-information-
template-law of nature, a forensic view of DNA that reveals the complex 
ineligibility of this molecule for patenting, without invoking a simple theory 
of genetic exceptionalism.  
The method claims in genetic testing are essential for capturing the 
application of genetic status for diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic 
purposes in medical care.  The legal tests that originated with business 
method patent cases—the UCT and the MOT tests206—are capable of 
dictating outcomes that may be directly opposite to the public domain 
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protecting analysis of the preemption inquiry. It is possible to imagine 
examples of inventions that would pass the UCT or MOT tests, but which, 
viewed through the alternative test of preemption, would not be patentable.  
Thus, the tests may not be congruent; the relative weight accorded to the 
transformation analysis or the preemption analysis may be outcome-
determinative. The legal standards from the business method patent cases 
arose to answer the central dilemma for that field—must an invention have 
a tangible form or be tied to physical processes?  These were not the 
pressing questions from life science patenting. Instead, the central questions 
for biological patenting involved whether natural processes were being 
patented, and whether the preemption of basic scientific knowledge 
occurred. As a result of the fact that some of the important life science 
patent cases involving method claims have been litigated without directly 
reaching the public domain questions embedded in the patentable subject 
matter doctrine, the field awaits more definitive guidelines for how the 
detailed investigation of biological mechanism can coexist with patent 
law’s prohibition on patenting basic and essential knowledge. 
The most pressing questions in patentable subject matter for the life 
sciences are presented in AMP207 and they could be resolved in the 
appellate courts over the next several years.  The courts confront an 
opportunity to update the set of “basic tools” for genetic science, and to 
settle these eligibility controversies for the benefit of scientists, medical 
practitioners, and patients who seek to use isolated genes and genetic 
correlations in research and medical care. The Supreme Court could decide 
to hear AMP, in recognition of the sensibility it expressed when the Court 
raised the patentable subject matter issue sua sponte in LabCorp.208  That 
does not indicate how the Court might rule.  However, one advantage of the 
full attention of the Supreme Court to the patentable subject matter 
questions in AMP is that it presents both composition and method claims in 
the genetic sciences.  
The patenting of applied research and true invention can coexist 
alongside the preserve of open and available knowledge, and both will 
contribute to future developments in genetic science. It should be possible 
to reconcile the prohibitions on patenting laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas with careful patenting practices that advance 
the application of genetics to medicine.   
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